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Introduction 
Prosocial behaviour is broadly defined as behaviour that generally benefits other people 
(Penner et al.,2005, Dovidio and Penner, 2004) and covers a range of behaviours such 
as helping, cooperating and donating to charity. Authors tend to consider altruism and 
helping as subcategories of prosocial behaviour.  Studies on helping focus on 
intentional acts that have the outcome of benefiting another person, while research on 
altruism studies the motivation underlying the behaviour (Dovidio and Penner, 2004).  
The literature on prosocial behaviour is vast (see Stürmer and Snyder, 2010; Penner et 
al., 2005 and Schoereder et al, 1995 for recent reviews). I will be focusing on one 
particular aspect of prosocial behaviour: giving to charity. Although this is a very recent 
and new direction in prosocial research, the findings are potentially of great value to 
society’s well-being in general and humanitarian agencies’ appeals and campaigns. 
This potential applicability to real life situations is one of the reasons for my choice of 
topic. The other is of a strategic nature. Donating to charity presents a real challenge to 
current directions in prosocial research as many of its key theories cannot be applied to 
this form of prosocial behaviour.  For example, evolutionary theories of prosocial 
behaviour – arguably one of the strongest trends in the field – carry no explanatory 
power when applied to charity donations. Neo-Darwinian models of evolution, which 
define evolutionary success as the survival of one’s genes in subsequent generations, 
believe that three evolutionary processes best explain why prosocial acts lead to 
evolutionary success and therefore motivate helping behaviour: kin selection, reciprocity 
and group selection (Penner et al. 2005). The principle of kin selection as motivator for 
prosocial behaviour, based on the premise that what matters in evolution is inclusive 
fitness – e.g. the successful transmission of one’s genes to the next generation – is 
regularly contradicted by people willingly donating to total strangers. Similar reasons 
make the second explanation, reciprocity, equally inapplicable as it is highly unlikely that 
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victims of an earthquake in Iran will ever be in a position to reciprocate the kindness 
from anonymous donations, or that donors are motivated by such expectation. Finally, 
the principle of group selection – e.g. in a situation of competition between two groups, 
the one with more altruistic members willing to sacrifice themselves for the group, 
stands a better chance of survival – is hardly relevant to helping distant strangers and 
charitable giving, by definition benefiting ‘the other’ to one’s genetic group. 
 
Similarly inadequate is the cost-reward analysis of helping (Piliavin et al., 1981). This 
theory takes an economic view of human behaviour. It assumes that people, primarily 
motivated by self-interest, tend to maximise their rewards and minimize their costs. 
Whilst this theory is a good predictor in emergency situations – e.g. returning a stranded 
pet carries potential more reward and less danger than intervening in a fight, thus 
making the former a more likely choice – it is not informative when it comes to deciding 
to sign up, or not,  for a standing order to Oxfam, even if we were to consider this as a 
type of emergency helping For similar reasons, the arguably most famous strand of 
experiments, that on bystander passivity, also cannot be applied to donations to charity.  
Even though there have been attempts to apply the Latane’ and Darley’s (Latane’ & 
Darley, 1970; Latane’ and Nida, 1981) five step model of bystander intervention to non-
emergency situations (e.g. Borgida et al. 1992; Rabow et al., 1990), overall this theory 
is fundamentally concerned with understanding how people respond in emergencies 
that require immediate assistance.   
 
Several other theories of prosocial behaviour, however, have been applied to explain 
audiences’ responses to news of genocide or mass atrocities, or to charity and 
humanitarian appeals.  These studies seem to have been motivated by the widespread 
concern about audiences’ moral apathy and unresponsiveness (e.g. Geras, 1999 
Singer, 2009 etc). Different explanations have been given for the moral apathy that 
seems to characterise audiences’ responses.  Some have suggested that differences in 
responses are due to donors’ decision making styles (Supphellen & Nelson, 2001), 
whilst others have argued that humanitarian appeals provoke ‘psychophysical numbing’ 
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where the human ability to appreciate loss of life reduces as the loss becomes greater 
(Slovic 2007).  
 
Others have focused on ‘identifiable victim effect’ theory. This is where there is a higher 
likelihood of response when the appeal identifies an individual victim (Kogut and Ritov, 
2005a) or specific family (Small & Loewenstein, 2003; Warren and Walker 1991) and 
whether this could be attributed to smaller numbers evoking more compassion (Kogut 
and Ritov, 2005a) or because it enabled the respondents to feel more competent 
(Warren & Walker, 1991).  
 
Mixed results have come from the application of the ‘theory of planned behaviour’ 
(Smith & Sweeney, 2007) or the ‘dual processing theory’ (Epstein 1994) to audience 
apathy. Slovic (2007) and Epstein (1994) have blamed the failure of System 2 (rational, 
normative analysis) to inform and direct System 1 processing of information 
(experiential, intuitive and affect-based response). 1Loewenstein and Small (2007) have 
focused on the interaction between ‘sympathy’ and ‘deliberation’ and how the two are 
affected by proximity, similarity, vividness and one’s past and vicarious experiences.  
 
Several things are made clear from this brief review. The first is that existing research 
rarely differentiates between charitable giving to an ongoing needy cause (e.g. 
sponsoring a child in India) and giving in response to a request for help in the immediate 
aftermath of a natural disaster (e.g. a Tsunami or earthquake). Yet these two types of 
giving  are quite different in terms of ongoing commitment required, the role of 
emotional reaction as opposed to rational deliberation, the immediacy of response to 
media pressure versus normative motivations and so on. The second  is that the field 
lacks a comprehensive theory able to draw the various findings together into a more 
holistic and inclusive picture. . This doesn’t just pertain to helping and giving but extends 
to debates around altruism, as has already been picked up by some researchers. For 
                                                          
1
 S1 is experiential or intuitive, affect-based and a much quicker, easier and more 
efficient way to navigate an increasingly complex and uncertain world than S2, which is 
based on more rational analyses.   
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example, Bartolini (2005) has criticised attempts to isolate individual or similar sets of 
emotions empirically or theoretically, and argued that audiences’ multiple emotional 
reactions to altruistic requests should be studied more holistically. The need for 
expansion, integration and synthesis has also been expressed by others (Penner et al. 
2005, Levine and Thompson, 2004). Alongside this, we begin to see more complex and 
less linear views of prosocial motivation.  Shaw et al., (1994), for example, studied how 
people might be motivated to actively avoid feelings of empathy for those in need, lest 
they be motivated to help them.2 A further reaching critique has been moved by authors 
interested in a dialogue between science, philosophy and religion in prosocial behaviour 
(Post et al. 2002, offer an inspiring collection of these debates).  For example, Sober 
(2002) re-positions psychology as an ideologically and socially embedded discipline by 
wondering whether the popularity of a purely egoistic image of the human self is 
determined by a culture of individualism and competition, rather than it being due to the 
compelling force of the findings. Wyschogrod (2002), on the other hand, criticises 
mainstream social psychology for portraying altruism as a content of one’s 
consciousness because this does not allow for a moral understanding of prosocial 
behaviour. Influenced by Levinas , she argues instead that altruism is contingent on 
relating to others as a moral  demand on the self to engage in other-regarding acts. To 
attribute either altruism or selfishness to genes is to see them as moral agents rather 
than transmitters of information (p. 30). 
 
The third thing we learn from a review of existing research is that , with the exception of 
a few isolated and/or marginalised voices, the field is still dominated by a deductive 
mode of research and the vast majority of studies are theory driven. Hence, research 
findings are contradictory (or inconsistent).  It is not the contradictions per se that I find 
problematic, but how they are addressed and resolved by mainstream social 
psychology. Like a dog chasing its own tail, mainstream psychology, by refusing to open 
up to different epistemological and methodological frameworks, is trapped by its own 
self-defined rigid boundaries, thus foreclosing the understanding of crucial and exciting 
facets of human prosocial behaviour.  
                                                          
2
 I shall come back to this study as it introduces the crucial concept of resistance 
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The elephant in the room: Society, ideology and moral reasoning  
Studies exploring audiences’ (un)responsiveness in terms of immediacy of, or 
identification with, the victim are a good illustration. For example, Kogut and Ritov 
(2005a) found that, in experimental situations, the group given details about a specific 
victim gave significantly more than the group that had received only general information. 
These results were replicated in a similar study by the same researchers (2005b). It has 
thus been claimed (Singer 2009) that ‘the identifiable victim effect’ leads to the ‘rule of 
rescue’ (p.47). Similarly, the recognition of similarity or common fate which gives rise to 
a sense of ‘we-ness’ – a sense of belonging to the same group – increases the 
likelihood of helping the in-group (Penner et al., 2005). This process has been explained 
in terms of a favouritism bias towards members of one’s own group as opposed to 
members of other groups (Hewstone et al., 2002, Mullen et al. 1992) On similar lines, 
Levine and Thompson (2004) found that social category relations rather than 
geographical proximity or emotional reactions, were the most important factors in 
increasing responsiveness to humanitarian appeals. One of the strongest examples of 
this is the behaviour of the Swiss population in response to similar appeals from 
different parts of the world. The first appeal followed a landslide in the Swiss canton of 
Wallis in 2000; the second an earthquake in the Iranian city of Bam in 2003. Large 
amounts of money were donated by individuals in Switzerland to aid the victims of both 
natural disasters. But the difference in amount is remarkable:  the Iranian victims 
received 9 million Swiss Francs, whilst the Swiss received 74 million Swiss Francs 
(Meier, 2006). This difference is made even more significant by the disparity in wealth of 
the victim groups. Even taking into consideration factors such as the increased potential 
for reciprocity from the receivers of the higher donations due to geographical proximity, 
it is apparent that social categorisation played a crucial role.  
 
What I want to question, however, is not that this factor plays an important role, but why 
and the kind of answers that mainstream psychology is able to provide to this question.  
There is a widespread implication that this is how humans operate; a matter of fact, self-
evident, but often unspoken, idea that it is all down to human nature. When probed 
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further, the answer is almost invariably evolutionary. Singer (2009), in reviewing current 
prosocial research, calls it ‘parochialism’ and claims that “it is easy to understand why 
we are like this”; i.e. that “our concern for the welfare of others tends to be limited to our 
kin, and to those with whom we are in cooperative relationships, and perhaps to 
members of our own small tribal group” (p.51). This is because, for several millions of 
years, parents who did not care for their children were unlike to pass on their genes. 
 
Can there really be no other explanation than the behaviour of our ancestors millions of 
years ago?  Singer  (2007) providing data to support this claim, cites three disasters:  
the tsunami in Southeast Asia in 2004 (220,000 were killed and donations reached 
$1.54 billion from US citizens), Hurricane Katarina in 2005 (1,600 died and Americans 
gave $6.5 billion) and the earthquake in Pakistan in October 2005 (73,000 were killed, 
but it elicited only $150 million in US donations).  He then, almost in passing, adds that 
the earthquake was the only one of these tragic events that was not caught on video 
and so did not result in dramatic and oft-repeated television coverage. And why not? 
Could it be then, that difference in media coverage is not accidental but reveals an 
active ideological operation?  That humanitarian tragedies in distant parts of the world 
that do not involve westerners are presented from the start as less important, the 
victims as a faceless mass, rather than somebody we can identify with, is a well known 
and accepted fact (see Chouliaraki 2006 for a compelling and pertinent analysis of the 
politics of representation). In which case, the construction of the ‘worthy victim’ seems 
to have very little to do with hard-wired evolutionary processes, and a lot to do with 
specific geo-political and ideological practices. 
 
The de-contextualisation of social phenomena and, in particular, the problematic neglect 
of ideological and socio-historical  factors, leads to a very narrow focus and disregard of 
alternative, more complex understanding of prosocial behaviour. Not all experimental 
psychological work does that. For example, a recent strand of investigation into the role 
played by social identity in helping (Reicher et al, 2006; Levine et al, 2005) 
demonstrates that, indeed, it is possible to do experimental work and still engage with 
the political and ideological domains. But, alas, these studies are a rare minority.  A 
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preference for insular, reductionist and deterministic answers is best exemplified by a 
series of recent studies (Slovic and Slovic, 2004; Slovic, 2007a; 2007b; Small et 
al.,2007). 
 
Slovic is concerned with the ongoing moral apathy that characterises audiences’ 
responses to news of genocide or mass atrocities. Why – Slovic asks – do not these 
massive crimes against humanity spark us into action?. His answer is to blame what he 
terms ‘psychophysical numbing’. In agreement with Epstein (1994), he says that the so-
called ‘dual-process theories of thinking’ are in operation. According to this we have 
System 1 and System 2 modes of thinking. S1 is experiential or intuitive and is affect 
based and is a much quicker, easier and more efficient way to navigate an increasingly 
complex and uncertain world than S2, which is based on more rational analyses.  
Although one of the functions of S2 is to monitor S1, this is often lax and allows S1 to be 
expressed in behaviour even when erroneous. This is crucial because emotional 
responses such as compassion, empathy, sympathy etc. – all part of S1 – have been 
found to be vital in motivating people to action. Importantly, it would also explain why 
people might simultaneously hold humanitarian values and not act accordingly. 
  
This is why, even though according to S2 we highly value human life and as a rational 
calculation the loss of 100 lives is greater than the loss of 1, what matters is what we 
respond to emotionally. Slovic then goes on to describe several experiments 
demonstrating that the emotional reaction to a group is much less than to a single 
individual. He argues that this psychophysical numbing seems to follow the same sort of 
psychophysical function that characterises our diminished sensitivity to a wide range of 
perceptual and cognitive entities as their underlying magnitude increases. Constant 
increases in the magnitude of a stimulus typically evoke smaller and smaller changes in 
response. “Applying this principle to the valuing of human life suggests that a form of 
psychophysical numbing may result from our inability to appreciate losses of life as they 
become larger” (p.2) 
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So, Slovic argues, the problem is in our congenital difficulties with numbers which, all 
too often, represent dry statistics “human beings with the tears dried off”, that lack 
feeling and fail to motivate action (Slovic & Slovic 2004). When it comes to compassion, 
he claims, using an identified individual victim is the best way of eliciting it.  Charities 
such as Save the Children have long recognised that it is better to present a donor with 
a single named child to support than to ask for contributions to the bigger cause; but 
why is this? Slovic rapidly shies away from the socio-cultural dimensions and turns 
instead to behavioural research according to which a single individual, unlike a group, is 
viewed as a psychologically coherent unit. This leads to more extensive processing of 
information and stronger impressions about individuals than about groups.  
 
I find this type of reasoning problematic on two counts. First, I find Slovic’s rendering of 
prosocial reactions disturbingly mechanistic and reductionist. Surely there must be more 
to moral action than the ‘stimulus – emotional arousal – action’ chain he describes. 
Audiences are not inert, nor are they as unsophisticated as Slovic would make us 
believe. Second, why resort to evolution when there is so much history and ideology to 
understand in these phenomena? The problem with ‘scientific neutrality’ is that it blinds 
us to crucial differences. Slovic’s outrage at the West’s indifference and apathy to the 
plight of distant others is passionate and commendable. Many of his conclusions are 
valid and interesting, but his insights are crippled by the epistemology and methodology 
he uses. It is because of that that he can seamlessly move from applying results using a 
victim of famine in Malawi to the genocide in Darfur or to natural disasters in South Asia 
or the victims of 9/11 and so on. I can imagine that from a scientific point of view these 
are simply ‘neutral’ stimuli to study what ostensibly might appear to be the same 
phenomenon of prosocial behaviour.  To anybody outside the insularity of psychology it 
would be obvious that these humanitarian disasters are historically, socially and 
politically profoundly different from one another. Equally, their meaning will impact in a 
specific way on each participant according to their beliefs, and relative positioning in 
regard to each specific phenomenon. It is this meaningful intersection that could throw 
important light on audiences’ reactions to appeals. It is ironic that having just concluded 
that humans do not deal well with numbers when it comes to humanitarian 
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emergencies, all we get from research is numbers rather than participants telling us 
what they felt and thought. It seems that the insularity of mainstream psychology and its 
allegiance to natural rather than social science, means that the more credible, obvious 
and interesting explanations for prosocial behaviour, or its absence, are neglected.   
 
Stürmer and Snyder (2010), in their recent collection on prosocial research, have 
pointed out that “the traditional focus of social psychological research has been on the 
interpersonal context of helping [...]. Thus, in this tradition, explanations of why people 
help one another and why they fail to help one another typically have revolved around 
the role of individual dispositions, individual decision-making processes, individual 
emotions, and the norms that govern the interpersonal relationship between individual 
helpers and individual recipients of help (p.4) The authors problematise the 
individualistic focus and argue for the necessity of research that can explain how 
“social, structural, political or epidemiological factors translate into concrete 
experiences, motives and action at the individual level” and how “structural factors 
derive their subjective meaning through social and political framing processes in the 
context of the groups or communities to which individuals belong” (ppg: 5-6). 
 
Yet, hardly any attention is paid to meaning and the psychosocial processes individuals 
engage in in making sense of and responding to charities’ appeals about the suffering of 
distant strangers. I will discuss more at length how the strictures of laboratory-based 
methods borrowed from the natural sciences preclude this and other crucial 
investigations. Here I would like to reflect a bit longer on the model of ‘human subject’ 
underlying current research.   
 
Locked up in the attic? Irrationality, troubled emotions and conflict  
In the majority of the experiments in prosocial behaviour the participants often appear 
one-dimensional and flat. Even when we get demographic information about them, it is 
hard to get a sense of their subjectivity, of who they are.  There is rarely attribution of 
agency, moral or otherwise, to the participants in the experiment. Their responses 
appear predetermined; the outcome predictable as, however responsive and caring 
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participants might be to begin with, the scope of their possible moral response is 
foreclosed by their cognitive malfunctioning or calculations.  
 
There are some exceptions. For example, Laura Shaw and her colleagues (Shaw et al. 
1994) carried out a very interesting experiment. They started from dissatisfaction with 
the naivety of Heider’s (1958) belief that feelings of sympathy, compassion and 
empathy for those in need evoke motivation to help them and that this is a well known 
fact. The authors, totally correct in my view, then became interested in what this 
knowledge might do to subjects whose sympathy and empathy are evoked, and set out 
to explore whether being aware of an expectation to help might affect their responses. 
They wondered whether, given this knowledge, people might actively circumvent feeling 
empathy to avoid having to help. This is particularly the case when the helping appears 
costly. Their findings support this hypothesis. What interests me in these findings is not 
so much what they say about decision-making processes – as I said previously, the 
cost-reward model is not much help in explaining the relatively low cost of helping 
involved in a donation. It is that it presents audiences as complex, reflective and 
sophisticated in their awareness of what is expected of them and of having their 
emotions to some extent manipulated. Crucial, unspoken but implicit in this construction 
of subjectivity, is the notion of resistance or ‘defended subject’.  This is so obvious and 
banal it hardly merits writing about it – who has not experienced those moments of 
conflict and uncertainty when faced with an outstretched hand, or an appeal for money,. 
As yet, mainstream social psychological research has paid little attention to those 
battles between social responsibility and self-interest – at least not in their complex 
interplay and constant changeability-  and the everyday internal moral squabbles. The 
interest is obviously there as testified by many studies. For example, Batson et al. 1995, 
or Lowenstein and Small, 2007, just to cite two, both look at moral and reason/emotion 
conflict in decision making. However, what seems to dominate the experiment is the 
deductive imperative - whether the findings do or do not confirm the model -  and/or a 
very dualistic and rigid understanding of the relationship between emotions and 
reasons, whereby “’sympathy’ is caring but immature and irrational [...] and ‘deliberation’ 
is rational but uncaring” (2007:113). These are evaluative statements deriving from 
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specific societal values.  The depiction of these two systems, their separateness and 
how they interact is also highly dubious.  In short, the epistemological scientific 
underpinnings of mainstream psychology preclude the full exploration of a more 
complex operation of these factors and of how they might impact on prosocial 
behaviour. 
 
Contrary to mainstream social psychology, a psychosocial analysis (Frosh, 2003) 
assumes that audiences have emotional investments and psychodynamic inclinations 
that intersect with what is culturally available to them (Clarke and Hoggett, 2009); it 
recognises the power of unconscious dynamics and the significance of psychic conflict 
(Roseneil, 2006). It posits that “the real events of the external, social world are 
defensively, as well as discursively, appropriated (Hollway, 2004:7). In line with this 
approach I assume that there are emotional and intra-psychic aspects to audiences’ 
reactions to appeals that are crucial in determining responses (Seu, 2003a). There 
might be emotional stumbling blocks to higher responsiveness which might relate to 
personal sensitivities and specific personal and biographical experiences. Denial, both 
in the strictest sense of intrapsychic defence mechanisms and in Cohen’s (2002) more 
psychosocial rendition might be at play in audiences’ responses. Specifically, appeals 
are bound to provoke emotions and emotional conflicts, memories, past traumas; and 
personal experience of being cared for, or not, in times of need might be evoked and/or 
denied in response to information about humanitarian emergencies and charity appeals. 
 
To add complexity to this picture, there seems to be an intriguing difference in 
responses to refugees viewed through the safe distance of the media and the possibly 
threatening closeness when they appear in the form of beggars on our streets (Seu, 
2003b). So conflict is not just ubiquitous, it is also socially determined and contextual 
(Seu, forthcoming).  It is not that social psychologists are unaware of this. For example, 
Lowenstein and Small (2007:115) say: “The specific situations and target-objects that 
evoke sympathy are certainly mediated by culture and personal experience, but many 
responses seem to be programmed at a more fundamental level, as suggested by the 
fact that they can be discerned in “lower” animals such as nonhuman primates and even 
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rats.” This statement sums up nicely and clearly how social psychologists studying 
prosocial behaviour often opt for a reductionist view of humanity.  Even though this is 
not always the end result, the choice of words in defining hard-wired, genetic factors in 
behaviour as “more fundamental” than societal factors reveals the hegemonic position 
of evolutionary explanations and the ideological underpinning of such studies.   Kegan 
(2002) addresses head-on the emotional and ideological investments of positions such 
as described above. He astutely points out that anyone with a modest knowledge of 
animal behaviour could find examples to support almost any ethical message desired. 
Those who wish to sanctify the institution of marriage can point to the pair bonding of 
gibbons; those who think infidelity is more natural can point to chimpanzees.  If one 
believes that people are naturally sociable, point to baboons; if one thinks they are 
solitary, point to orangutans, and so on. “Humans are selfish and generous, aloof and 
empathic, hateful and loving, dishonest and honest, disloyal and loyal, cruel and kind, 
arrogant and humble; but many feel a little guilty over an excessive display of the first 
member of those pairs. […] I suspect that some people feel better when they learn that 
their less social urges are natural consequences of their phylogenetic history (Kegan 
2002: 49).  
Kegan moves the debate from the scientific to the ideological content of psychological 
theories. He argues that in a society in which a large number of strangers must compete 
for a small number of positions of dignity, status and economic security, it is adaptive to 
be self-interested and disadvantageous to be too cooperative, too loyal, too altruistic, or 
too reluctant to protest unjust advantage taken by another “but rather than acknowledge 
that the structure of our society has forced each of us to adopt self-interest as the first 
rule, many Americans find it more attractive to believe that this mood is an inevitable 
remnant of our animal heritage and, therefore, one must learn to accept it.” (Kegan, 
2002: 48-49). 
 
If there is truth in these claims, then it is hardly surprising that the integration of hard-
wired factors with a more socially informed understanding of prosocial behaviour is 
avoided from the start and perpetuated through a very specific and narrow choice of 
methodologies.  
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The shackles of method: the limitations of positivism when studying prosocial 
behaviour. 
Meier (2006:3) sums up nicely the tendency in current research in prosocial behaviour:  
“If it is possible to isolate the conditions that lead to prosocial behaviour, this will 
increase the understanding of the motivations to contribute money and time to public 
goods”. So, why is he surprised that whilst “for decades results in laboratory 
experiments have offered insight abut motivations for prosocial behaviour, it is still 
unclear how these results can be applied outside the laboratory”? (2007:4)  
 
There are several reasons why social psychological findings can rarely be applied to 
everyday situations. The previous sections of this review have looked at how the 
disregard for social and ideological factors, and for conflictual and more complicated 
emotions have made psychological studies true to a positivistic scientific epistemology 
but do not approximate the complexity and messiness of  life. 
 
This last section looks more closely at the methodogical constraints. Criticism of 
laboratory experimentation in relation to prosocial behaviour follows from a well 
established, albeit marginalised, tradition of critique in the last 30-40 years in social 
psychology (e.g. Gergen (1973), Tajfel (1972). I will only be able to address some of 
these criticisms.  The first problem is that the overwhelming majority of social 
psychological experiments are carried out in laboratory situations where, as Meier 
describes above, individual factors are isolated and studied as variables. This produces 
many tidy experiments but is a far cry from the complexities of real life. Crucially, such 
isolating move is counterintuitive as prosocial behaviour is by definition based on 
interaction and, arguably, the ‘social’ activity par excellence.  
 
When conducting survey studies the method of choice is questionnaires. Korobov and 
Bamberg, (2004) criticise this from a discursive perspective. They contend that the key 
problem is that expressing a forced choice or Likert-scale attitude is entirely different 
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from expressing an attitude in daily social interaction. First, questionnaire questions 
tend to reify the issue under scrutiny by stabilizing the item in the form of relatively 
stereotypical and arguably facile descriptions. Second, the forced-choice format 
systematically strips off the interactive subtleties and rhetorical finessing that are part of 
the daily expression of attitudes, evaluations and assessments (2004:473).  As has 
been repeatedly argued (Parker 1997; Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Edwards and Potter, 
1992; Potter,1996; Wetherell and Potter, 1992; Wetherell and Edley's,  1999, Billig  et 
al. 1988, just to cite a few), and experienced daily, embracing contradiction and 
inconsistency is probably what we do best as humans as part of the fabric of everyday, 
moral and immoral, reasoning (Billig et al. 1988). Yet, inconsistencies are seen in 
mainstream psychological experiments as a sign that something has gone wrong with 
the design, in other words, is a problem.  
 
We live in a global society, where moral boundaries shift continuously in line with the 
forever-changing identity of who is friend or foe. We experience the daily tensions in our 
social responsibility between ever stronger pulls towards rampant and greedy 
individualism and global compassion.  With such unstable global, political and socially 
determined norms, the glaring inconsistencies in findings should be celebrated and 
embraced as the beginning of recognition that this is ‘the nature of the beast’. They 
should be seen as crucial information, as ‘openings’. Unfortunately, as I have illustrated 
earlier, there seems to be a consistent move away from complexity, a clinging to 
isolating in the futile hope of predicting behaviour.  A psychosocial approach can begin 
to remedy these problems by looking at the inter-relatedness of factors, rather than 
studying them in isolation; by approaching reasons and emotions not as separate and 
differentially valued but as they interact in the conscious and unconscious negotiations 
and fluctuations of subjectivity; by valuing conflict as a crucial and unavoidable factor in 
everyday morality; by socially and biographically re-contextualising prosocial behaviour. 
Mainstream empirical psychologists might criticise psychosocial approaches for not 
providing a way to chart through the complexities by controlling individual factors. This 
is, indeed, a fair criticism. The contribution of a psychosocial approach to prosocial 
behaviour is not simply in offering a fine grained and nuanced picture of the 
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phenomenon. Crucially, a psychosocial approach has the potential to reconfigure our 
understanding of prosocial behaviour by providing a holistic and ultimately truer 
reflection of the complexities of everyday morality and prosocial behaviour, and the 
intricate, conflicted and ambivalent process of decision making leading to – or away 
from - it. 
 
We struggle to make sense of an increasingly complex reality and our moral boundaries 
are drawn and re-drawn in line with shifting social and global realities. The ideological, 
cultural and inter-subjective ramifications constantly affect us and are always influential  
in our choices. There is no such  thing as a ‘neutral’ stimulus when it portrays a dark-
skinned child in Africa or a white business man in New York. Social psychology urgently 
needs to change and adapt to such complexities to be able to make a useful 
contribution to the understanding of prosocial behaviour. 
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